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Abstract 
To date, the majority of investigations in to accuracy in detecting deception have used low 
stakes lies as stimulus materials, and findings from these studies suggest that people are 
generally poor at detecting deception. The research presented here utilised real life, high stakes 
lies as stimulus materials, to investigate the accuracy of police and non-police observers in 
detecting deception. It was hypothesised that both police and non-police observers would 
achieve above chance levels of accuracy in detecting deception, that police officers would be 
more accurate at detecting deception than non-police observers, that confidence in veracity 
judgements would be positively related to accuracy, and that consensus judgements would 
predict veracity. 107 observers (70 police officers and 37 non-police participants) watched 36 
videos of people lying or telling the truth in an extremely high stakes, real life situation. Police 
observers achieved mean accuracy in detecting deception of 72%, non-police observers 
achieved 68% mean accuracy, and confidence in veracity judgements were positively related 
to accuracy. Consensus judgements correctly predicted veracity in 92% of cases.  
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Meta-analytic findings suggest that, in general, people are poor at detecting deception. Bond 
and DePaulo (2006), in their meta-analysis, report an overall average accuracy in detecting 
deception of 54%, which is barely above the 50% accuracy that would be expected by chance. 
Furthermore, a review of the research has suggested that there is no relationship between 
accuracy and confidence in making judgements of veracity (DePaulo et al., 1997), such that 
when people attempt to detect deception, they report feeling as confident in their decisions 
when they are incorrect, as when they are correct. However, it is possible that such findings 
may reflect some major limitations in the dominant methodology used in deception research.  
One possible explanation for the generally low accuracy rates, and lack of relationship 
between accuracy and confidence, is that they are an artefact of the stimulus materials used in 
the experiments; i.e. the large majority of studies of deception detection have used low stakes 
lies as stimulus materials. Miller and Stiff (1993) have suggested that in typical laboratory 
studies, the stakes are not high enough to elicit discernible cues to deception, and thus deceit 
is almost impossible to detect, as detection is dependent on the cues available. These types of 
low stakes lies may differ from more high stakes lies, for example, lying about committing a 
crime, in which the consequences of not being believed are serious for the person telling the 
lie. One implication is that this may lead to underestimates of the accuracy of observers in 
detecting deception in more realistic forensic situations. Relevant here are the meta-analytic 
findings of DePaulo et al. (2003), that strong motivation to succeed in the lie, lies which were 
identity relevant, and lies about transgressions, were all moderating factors that produced more 
prominent cues to deception. These are factors that are more likely to be present in high stakes 
situations than in low stakes situations, particularly in a forensic context. Correspondingly, one 
might expect high stakes situations to produce more prominent and reliable cues to deception, 
and consequently also improve the accuracy of observers in detecting deception. 
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Despite the limitations of laboratory experiments, there has been very little research 
investigating accuracy in detecting deception in real life, high stakes situations. The few studies 
that have investigated this have produced reasonably consistent results, which differ from meta-
analytic findings of low stakes deception detection (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), and suggest that 
people may be able to detect deception with accuracy substantially above chance levels: in a 
series of studies using videos of police interviews with suspects as stimulus materials (Mann 
& Vrij, 2006; Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2004, 2006; Vrij & Mann, 2001a; Vrij, Mann, Robbins & 
Robinson, 2006), police officers’ credibility judgements were consistently accurate at rates 
well above chance levels, at  68%, 65%, 69%, 64% and 72% respectively. These relatively 
high accuracy rates are important, as previous studies, using low stakes stimulus materials, 
have suggested that police officers are no more accurate than laypersons at detecting deception 
(for example, DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). 
It would appear then, that police officers’ ability to accurately detect deception increases when 
they view police interviews of suspects. However, due to restrictions placed on the viewing of 
the videos of the interviews, the authors of the aforementioned body of studies were unable to 
test whether non-police participants would also achieve higher accuracy than is usual in 
deception detection studies, leaving a number of important questions unanswered. For 
example, the higher accuracy rates may have been due simply to the use of high stakes lies, 
which may have magnified the behaviours used by the observers to differentiate between 
honest and deceptive behaviour, and so made them more easily discernible by all. 
Alternatively, it could be that police officers are particularly good at detecting deception in 
police interviews, due to a domain familiarity effect: research by O’Sullivan and Ekman 
(2004), found that law professionals were significantly more successful at identifying lies in a 
crime deception task than in an emotional deception task, whereas therapists showed the 
opposite pattern, suggesting that different groups of people may be more successful at 
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identifying types of lies with which they are most familiar. However, it is not known whether 
police officers would achieve comparable high accuracy in distinguishing truths from lies in 
other high stakes contexts, or whether the use of high stakes lies as stimulus materials would 
affect accuracy and truth bias in members of the public. Clearly, further investigation is needed 
into these issues. 
Also, findings regarding the relationship between observer accuracy and confidence in 
the credibility judgements of police officers in high stakes deception research have been mixed. 
In two studies no relationship was found between confidence and accuracy (Mann et al., 2004; 
Vrij & Mann, 2001b); however, in another study participants were more confident in their 
correct judgements than in their incorrect judgements of veracity (Mann et al., 2006). This 
finding in particular is interesting, as a review of the research in low stakes situations has 
suggested that there is no relationship between accuracy and confidence (DePaulo et al., 1997). 
Again, to the authors’ knowledge, there have been no published investigations of the 
relationship between accuracy and confidence in the general public, using high stakes lies as 
stimulus materials. It may be that if observers are able to base their credibility judgements on 
more pronounced cues to deception, they may be more accurate and also more confident in 
their accurate decisions.  
 Another issue that has not been addressed so far in any deception research, is the value 
of consensus judgements (i.e. a majority opinion) as predictors of veracity: if there is a strong 
consensus amongst observers that a ‘sender’ is lying, or telling the truth, how likely is it that 
the consensus judgement is correct? Most of the work in consensus effects psychology 
generally has concentrated on group influences on accuracy in decision making, in which 
members are required to make group decisions. The general finding is that group decisions 
where there is consensus are no more accurate, and sometimes less accurate, than individual 
decisions (Reagan-Cirincione, 1994). However, the kind of consensus effect referred to in the 
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present context concerns whether decisions are more accurate when there is an agreement 
amongst independently derived judgements. According to the general principle of aggregation, 
we might expect aggregated judgements to be more reliable and valid than individual scores. 
Perhaps the closest examples we have here are from the area of consensus forecasts (of weather, 
economy, production etc.), which, due to the principle of aggregation, consistently tend to be 
better when there is a consensus amongst independently derived forecasts (Blix, Wadefjord, 
Wienecke & Adahl, 2001). Although previous findings on low stakes situations have found 
little variance in observer accuracy in deception detection (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Levine, 
2010), this would perhaps not be surprising if there were few discernible cues to detect. 
However, if there are discernible cues to detect, it could be that consensus judgements derived 
from independent judges will most enable us to identify them accurately. 
In light of the above considerations, the main aim of the research presented here was to 
investigate the comparative accuracy of police and non-police participants, in detecting 
deception in a real life, high stakes situation. It was hypothesised that participants, both police 
and non-police, would produce accuracy rates in detecting deception above chance, because of 
the high stakes nature of the stimulus materials. It was further hypothesised that, due to the 
likelihood of increased exposure to deceptive behaviour in the course of their jobs (domain 
familiarity), police officers would be more accurate at detecting deception than the general 
public. By the same token, it was also expected that, within the police sample, officers in CID, 
who routinely interview suspects, would be more accurate in judging credibility than firearms 
officers, who do not routinely interview suspects. Additionally, despite mixed findings in 
previous research, it was hypothesised that the use of real life, high stakes deception as stimulus 
materials, would result in a positive relationship between accurate veracity judgements and 
confidence in all participants. Finally, it was hypothesised that, due to the principle of 
aggregation, consensus judgements would accurately predict veracity.  
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 107 participants were recruited to take part in the study. The participants were 37 
firearms officers, and 33 CID officers, of a large North West police service, and 37 
undergraduate students participating for course credit. Students were recruited using the 
University online participation system, and police officers were recruited using opportunity 
sampling. All participation was voluntary. There were 33 male and four female firearms 
officers, ages ranged from 26 to 53 (M = 37.27, SD = 6.98), and years of experience as a police 
officer ranged from six to 29 years (M = 13.35, SD = 6.38). There were 18 male and 15 female 
CID officers, whose ages ranged from 26 to 46 years (M = 34.18, SD = 6.40), and years of 
experience as a police officer ranged from two to 23 years (M = 9.67, SD = 5.73). There were 
four male and 33 female undergraduate students; their ages ranged from 18 to 25 years (M = 
19.19, SD = 1.58). None of the undergraduate students had been a police officer. It can be noted 
that although there were age and gender discrepancies between the groups, meta-analytic 
findings indicate that there is no effect of age or gender on accuracy in detecting deception 
(Aamondt & Custer, 2006) 
Materials 
To address the issues of ecological validity discussed above, the materials that were chosen as 
stimulus materials consisted of video footage of people making public appeals for help with 
missing or murdered relatives. It is not unusual, when a person goes missing or is killed, for a 
relative to appear before the press and appeal to the public to help find the missing person, or 
to help find out who killed the person. Sometimes the person making the appeal is honest; he 
or she is not involved in the death or disappearance of the relative, and is genuinely appealing 
to the public for help. However, sometimes the person making the appeal is deceptive; he or 
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she is involved in the death or disappearance of the relative, and the appeal is a deceptive 
communication, in which the appealer attempts to manipulate the beliefs of others by 
concealing knowledge of the crime, and falsifying an appeal (a deceptive appealer does not 
actually want the public to help find the relative, or find out who killed the relative). Thirty six 
appeals were used in the present study, 18 of which were honest, and 18 of which were 
deceptive. 
There were several advantages in using appeals as stimulus materials, for example; it 
allowed non-police participants to view the same stimulus materials as police officers, and 
therefore to compare non-police and police accuracy in detecting deception in a high stakes 
situation; it allowed the investigation of police accuracy in detecting deception in a context 
other than a police interview. It also allowed the adoption of a between subjects stimulus 
materials design; i.e. participants observed honest and deceptive individuals. In the majority of 
previous research investigating deception in high stakes situations, a within subjects stimulus 
materials design has been used (Mann & Vrij, 2006; Mann et al., 2004, 2006; Vrij & Mann, 
2001a; Vrij et al., 2006). In these studies, honest and deceptive sections of communications by 
individuals guilty of committing various crimes are compared, and this within subjects method 
is limited as it negates the possibility of examining the individuals holistically; i.e. if a person 
is lying in parts of his/her testimony, it does not follow that behaviours relevant to the 
classification of individuals as honest or deceptive, will be limited only to those parts of the 
testimony which are untruthful. Furthermore, although some have stressed the importance of 
using active interactive situations to study cues to deception (DePaulo & Bond, 2012; Vrij & 
Granhag, 2012), the method in which observers make judgements of deception by viewing 
short video clips in a passive paradigm reflects exactly how appeals are seen in real life: appeals 
are watched passively by observers, including police officers who are investigating the case.  
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Freely available video footage of people making public appeals for help with missing 
or murdered relatives was collected from various online news and media sites from the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Appeals were not considered 
for inclusion if they were recent and high profile in the UK, or if they were made many months 
or years after the event; all appeals included were made within one month of the relative going 
missing or being murdered. In all cases classified as deceptive, the appealer was convicted in 
a criminal court of involvement in the death (or in one case, kidnapping), of their relative. In 
all cases classified as honest, either another person was convicted of the death of the relative, 
or the relative was found with no evidence of a crime. Furthermore, appeals were considered 
for inclusion only if they satisfied stringent criteria for establishing ground truth; i.e. the 
evidence was strong enough to support the conclusion that the appeals were actually truthful 
or deceptive. According to other published research in this area, a number of criteria can be 
used to determine whether ground truth has been established; those used by ten Brinke and 
Porter (2012), and Vrij and Mann (2001b), were used here. Appealers were classified as honest 
or deceptive only if there was overwhelming evidence indicating the extent of their 
involvement in the death or disappearance of their relative using these criteria. For a full 
description of the sample used in the present study, including the criteria used for veracity 
classification, see Wright Whelan, Wagstaff and Wheatcroft (2013).  
 
Table 1 around here  
 
Procedure 
Participants attended the study in a psychology laboratory at the University, in groups ranging 
in size from three participants to 14 participants. There were seven groups of firearms officers, 
three groups of CID officers, and four groups of students. This variation in group size was a 
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result of the number of police officers able to participate at any particular session, and did not 
affect the running of the study. Each participant was given an instruction and response sheet. 
Participants were informed that they would be viewing short video clips of people appealing 
for help with missing or murdered relatives, and would be asked to decide whether they thought 
each appealer was lying (i.e. was actually involved in the death or disappearance of their 
relative), or telling the truth (i.e. was not involved in the death or disappearance of their 
relative). For each appeal, participants were also asked to rate how confident they were in their 
credibility judgement, on a Likert scale of 1 (not at all confident) to 5 (very confident). Before 
each appeal was shown, a short summary was provided of what was publicly known of the case 
at the time of the appeal, for example, ‘This clip features a man talking about his missing 34 
year old daughter, Nancy’. Each summary included: the relationship between the appealer and 
the relative (e.g. parent, spouse, sibling, child); the age of the missing or murdered relative if 
the appealer was a parent (to allow for possible differences in observers’ expectations of 
parental behaviour depending on whether, for example, their child was an infant or an adult); 
an explanation of any names, events or details mentioned in the appeal; and whether the relative 
was missing (i.e. no body had been found) or publicly known to be dead (i.e. the body had been 
found). Participants were asked to check a box on the response sheet if they were familiar with 
the appealer featured in the clip, or the outcome of the case, and to not complete the section of 
the response sheet (including the veracity judgement) for that appeal. In the group of firearms 
officers, the number of appeals with which any individual was familiar with ranged from zero 
appeals (four participants) to six appeals (one participant), M = 2.43, SD = 1.39. In the group 
of CID officers, the number of appeals with which any individual was familiar with ranged 
from zero appeals (one participant) to six appeals (two participants), M = 3.45, SD = 1.62. In 
the group of students, the number of appeals with which any individual was familiar with 
ranged from zero appeals (15 participants) to five appeals (two participants), M = 1.05, SD = 
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1.37. For each group, the appeals were shown in a different, randomised order. Participants 
were shown the first of the 36 appeals, and then completed the relevant section of the response 
sheet. This process was repeated for each appeal.  
 
Results 
Accuracy in Detecting Deception 
To investigate the hypothesis that participants would produce accuracy rates in detecting 
deception above chance, overall accuracy rates were calculated for each participant. Any cases 
which were known to a participant were not included in the accuracy scores. Overall mean 
accuracy was 70.75% (SD = 8.68), median accuracy was 71.88 %. There were large variations 
in individual accuracy, which ranged from 91% to 45%. It can be noted that 50% of police 
officers achieved accuracy rates of 74% or higher, and correspondingly that 27% of public 
participants achieved accuracy rates of 74% or higher. There was no relationship between 
accuracy and years of experience as a police officer (r = -.09, p = .461).  
As hypothesised, all groups of participants produced percentage accuracy rates above 
chance. Firearms officers achieved a median accuracy of 72.79%, which a sign test showed to 
be significantly above chance, Z = 5.92, p < .001 (all values were above 50). CID officers 
achieved a median accuracy of 74.17%, which a sign test showed to be significantly above 
chance, Z = 5.57, p < .001 (all values were above 50). The public achieved a median accuracy 
of 67.65%, which a sign test showed to be significantly above chance, Z = 5.50, p < .001 (35 
values were above 50).  
 To investigate whether there were differences in accuracy between the three groups of 
participants, and also between veracity conditions (i.e. deceptive appeals and honest appeals), 
a 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA (group: firearms, CID and public x veracity: deceptive and honest), 
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with repeated measures on the second factor was conducted on the percentage accuracy scores; 
the means and SDs are shown in Table 2.  
A significant main effect was found for group, F (2,104) = 3.37, p = .038, η2p = .061. 
Post hoc tests revealed that, as hypothesised, firearms officers (p = .031) and CID officers (p = 
.024) were significantly more accurate than the public. However, the difference in accuracy 
between firearms officers and CID officers was not significant (p = .874), offering no support 
for the hypothesis that CID officers would be more accurate at detecting deception than 
firearms officers.  
There was no significant main effect for veracity, however, there was a significant 
interaction between group and veracity, F (2,104) = 9.97, p < .001, η2p = .161. Post hoc tests 
showed CID officers were significantly more accurate (p = .007) when judging deceptive 
appeals than when judging honest appeals, and the public were significantly more accurate (p 
= .002) when judging honest appeals than when judging deceptive appeals. Further post hoc F 
tests revealed that firearms officers (p < .001), and CID officers (p < .001), were more accurate 
than the public when judging deceptive appeals. When judging honest appeals, there were no 
significant differences in accuracy between any of the groups. See Table 2.  
 
Table 2 around here  
 
Accuracy and Confidence in Credibility Judgements 
To investigate whether accuracy in credibility judgements was related to confidence in 
credibility judgements, mean confidence ratings were calculated for each participant for correct 
judgements of deceptive appeals, correct judgements of honest appeals, incorrect judgements 
of deceptive appeals, and incorrect judgements of honest appeals. A 3 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the last two factors was conducted on the mean confidence ratings, 
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with the factors group (firearms, CID and public), veracity (deceptive appeal and honest 
appeal), and judgement accuracy (correct judgement and incorrect judgement).  The means and 
SDs are presented in Table 3. 
As hypothesised, a significant main effect was found for judgement accuracy, F (1,102) 
= 126.11, p < .001, η2p = .553, so that, overall, participants were more confident in their correct 
judgements, than in their incorrect judgements. A significant main effect was also found for 
veracity, F (1,102) = 6.00, p = .016, η2p = .056, so that overall, participants were more confident 
in their judgements of deceptive appeals, than in their judgements of honest appeals.  
A significant interaction was found between veracity and judgement accuracy, F 
(1,102) = 13.28, p < .001, η2p = .115. Post hoc tests showed that for both honest and deceptive 
appeals, participants were more confident when making a correct judgement, than when 
making an incorrect judgement (p < .001). However, the interaction was caused by a difference 
in confidence between correct judgements for honest and dishonest appeals. Confidence was 
significantly higher for correct judgements in deceptive appeals, than for correct judgements 
in honest appeals (p < .001), whereas this was not the case for incorrect judgements.  
  
Table 3 around here 
 
Relationship of Consensus Judgements to Veracity 
To reiterate, the idea behind the consensus hypothesis is that when there is high consensus as 
to the veracity of a particular appeal, it is more likely to be accurate than inaccurate. So, for 
example, if 75% of people agree that a particular appeal is dishonest, it is likely to be dishonest. 
To investigate the utility of consensus judgements in determining the veracity of the appeals, 
therefore, for each appeal, the percentage of correct judgements of veracity (‘hits’), was 
compared with the percentage of incorrect judgements of veracity (‘misses’), using Wilcoxon 
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signed ranks tests. Hence this analysis looks at agreement on appeals, not whether individual 
observers are accurate.  
As expected, the percentage of correct judgements by participants (median = 72.77), 
was significantly greater than the percentage of incorrect judgements (median = 27.23), Z = - 
4.76, p = .001. Indeed, in 33 out of the 36 appeals, the percentage of ‘hits’ was greater than the 
percentage of ‘misses’. A consensus of 75% or over was always correct, and 17 appeals had a 
consensus over 75%. In other words, the more likely, collectively, people were to agree on the 
direction of a judgement, the more correct they were. 
Looking at police and public consensus separately, the percentage of ‘hits’ by police 
participants (median = 81.00) was significantly greater than the percentage of ‘misses’ by 
police participants (median = 19.00), Z = - 4.80, p < .001, and the percentage of ‘hits’ by public 
participants (median = 68.00) was significantly greater than the percentage of ‘misses’ by 
public participants (median = 32.00), Z = - 4.28, p < .001.  
 
Table 4 around here 
 
To investigate whether accurate consensus judgements were related to the length of the 
appeal, (i.e. it may be that a high level of accurate consensus is related to longer exposure to 
the ‘sender’), a Pearson’s correlation was conducted on the length of the appeals (seconds), 
and the number of ‘hits’ on the appeal. The relationship between length of appeal and 
percentage of correct judgements made about the appeal was not significant, r = .11, p = .513. 
 
Discussion 
The present findings support the general proposition that observers (both police and public) 
would be able to achieve accuracy rates in detecting deception above chance levels when 
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viewing ecologically valid stimulus materials, which suggests that the common proposal that 
people are poor at detecting deception (for example, Bond & DePaulo, 2006), may be an 
artefact of the methodology of utilising low stakes lies. Moreover, as the detection of deception 
necessarily implies differences between honest and deceptive behaviour, these findings support 
theoretical proposals that increasing the stakes may exacerbate factors underlying the 
production of cues to deception, resulting in more, and/or more prominent, cues to deception. 
There are several further, more specific implications: police officers in the present study were 
able to achieve high accuracy levels in a high stakes context other than that of police suspect 
interviews (although the context of appeals could still be regarded as forensic), and police 
officers were more accurate at detecting deception than the public. These are important findings 
because, as far as the authors are aware, there have been no previous investigations comparing 
police accuracy with public accuracy, when judging real life, high stakes lies. It may be that 
findings from previous research, which have reported that police participants are no more 
accurate than non-police participants (for example, DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Ekman & 
O’Sullivan, 1991), may have occurred at least partly because of the low stakes contexts of the 
stimulus materials. 
However, the proposal that police participants may achieve higher accuracy than 
participants from the public because they are exposed to more high stakes lies, was apparently 
not supported in that the number of years of experience as a police officer was not related to 
accuracy. Some light may be shed on this from the finding that it was the police officers’ ability 
to correctly identify deceptive appeals that accounted for their higher overall accuracy rates, as 
there was no difference in accuracy between police and non-police participants in correctly 
identifying honest appeals. One possible explanation for this is that, perhaps because of their 
training, and even limited experience in the field, in terms of Signal Detection Terms, Police 
officers are encouraged to adopt a more lax criterion (beta shift) for the classification of 
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deception, and a more cautious criterion for the classification of honesty, than the public. This 
would result in them paying more initial attention to cues for dishonesty than honesty. This, 
coupled with any benefits of more experience with people who (because of other evidence) are 
known to be lying, may give the police an advantage over the public that plateaus with a certain 
amount of experience (i.e. it will not necessarily improve with years of experience). It can be 
noted that in the sample used here, the minimum experience was two years. If this is the case, 
this suggests that only limited exposure to a range of individuals who are lying may be 
sufficient to boost the ability to detect deception.  
 Considering that meta-analytic reports (mainly involving low stakes studies) indicate 
that there is no relationship between confidence and accuracy when people make veracity 
decisions (DePaulo et al., 1997), the finding that there was a positive relationship between 
accurate veracity judgements and confidence, is potentially an important one. Previous findings 
using high stakes lies as stimulus materials have used only police participants, and have 
produced conflicting results (Mann et al., 2004, 2006; Vrij & Mann, 2001a). However, these 
studies used limited ranges of stimulus materials and within subjects designs, thus restricting 
both the potential for variance in the data, and the robustness of the results. This fits with other 
more general research on witness confidence and accuracy, which suggests that, with a wide 
range of stimuli that include easy or ‘obvious’ items which increase the variance, confidence-
accuracy relationships tend to be higher so that the more confident people are that they are 
correct, the more likely they are to actually be correct (Kebbell, Wagstaff & Covey 1996; 
Wheatcroft, Wagstaff, & Kebbell, 2004). Furthermore, participants were more confident when 
correctly identifying deceptive appealers than honest appealers, implying that deceptive 
appealers may be more ‘obvious’ to observers, than honest appealers. This could be due to a 
number of factors, for example, cues to deception may be more numerous and, perhaps, more 
prominent than cues to honesty, thereby making them more salient or ‘easier’ to recognise. 
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Also, in this context, one particular factor that might contribute to their prominence is norm 
violation; deceptive behaviours may be more prominent because they violate the norms of 
‘usual’ acceptable behaviour in social contexts.  
The investigation of consensus judgements in the present study was particularly 
important, as this is an aspect of deception detection that has not been previously explored, and 
the findings were important for two reasons. First, to the authors’ knowledge, observer 
consensus as a predictor of veracity has not previously been investigated, and the results from 
the present study suggest that it is an area that warrants further research. Second, it is unusual 
in deception research for any variable to predict veracity with accuracy as high as 92%. 
Evidently, as the utility of consensus judgements has not been previously investigated, the 
findings can only be regarded as preliminary, and replication would be needed before any firm 
conclusions can be drawn. For example, future research investigating the value of consensus 
judgements in a different high stakes context, or the minimum number of judges required for 
this effect, would be useful. Nonetheless, the present findings suggest that, in the context of 
appeals at least, there are sufficient deceptive and honest behaviours produced by the ‘senders’, 
for the majority of observers to make correct veracity judgements about them. It appears that 
Levine’s idea that above chance detection of deception is due to a few ‘leaky liars’ (2010) may 
not apply in this high stakes context, as nearly all appealers (both deceptive and honest) were 
sufficiently ‘leaky’ to be correctly classified by the consensus of observers.  
Moreover, despite large differences in the length of appeals (some were less than 20 
seconds, some were over two minutes long), there was no relationship between the percentage 
of correct credibility judgements, and the length of the appeal. This implies that, as providing 
observers with longer examples of behaviour did not affect their accuracy, observers may have 
been making rapid, accurate, global judgements, rather than relying on careful analysis of 
lengthy sections of behaviour. This suggests that observers may have been looking at a ‘type’ 
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of person, rather than specific behavioural cues, and this has important theoretical and 
methodological implications. In investigations of high stakes deception, particularly in a 
forensic context, honest and deceptive individuals may differ from each other not only in terms 
of whether or not they are lying, but also in whether or not they have committed a serious 
crime; if observers are able to make relatively accurate judgements about credibility using 
holistic judgements of the type of person who would, in this case, murder a relative, then using 
a between subjects design is a serious limitation, as it does not allow this difference to emerge. 
Moreover, theories of the production of behaviours related to deception have not generally 
taken in to account the possible role of individual differences between people who choose to 
commit serious crimes and lie about them, and those who do not (although see Wright Whelan 
et al., 2013). 
In sum, the findings from the present study have several important implications. One of 
the basic propositions of the present research was that using ecologically valid stimulus 
materials would produce results different to investigations of accuracy in detecting deception 
using low stakes stimulus materials; the findings presented here support this proposition. 
Research reporting observer accuracy in detecting high stakes deception is scant, and although 
the present findings contribute to this small body of research, there is wide scope for further 
investigation of this area. For example, replication is needed of the findings regarding the 
relatively high accuracy of non-police observers, and also of the relationship between accuracy 
and confidence in this group. Also, replication is needed of the finding that police observers 
are better able to detect deception than non-police observers, and of the factors that may 
underlie this difference. It is hoped that these basic findings will reinforce the importance of 
ecological validity in deception research.  
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